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JUST A SOUL WHOSE INTENTIONS ARE GOOD?
THE RELEVANCE OF A DEFENDANT’S
SUBJECTIVE INTENT IN DEFINING A
“DESTRUCTIVE DEVICE” UNDER THE
NATIONAL FIREARMS ACT
Elliot Buckman*
This Note addresses the three-way circuit split among the U.S. Courts of
Appeals over when, and to what extent, a court may consider a defendant’s
subjective intent in defining a “destructive device” under the National
Firearms Act. The circuit split centers on the Act’s ambiguous reference to
intent in its definition of a destructive device, which is a statutorily
prohibited firearm. After discussing the Act’s legislative history and
development, this Note considers the role of mens rea in National Firearms
Act cases. It next addresses the disagreement among the Courts of Appeals,
first detailing three cases that give rise to the disagreement and then
discussing additional cases which support each position. Finally, this Note
argues that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit’s view,
espousing a generally objective approach and eschewing a consideration of
a defendant’s intent outside of a small range of cases, is most consistent
with legislative history, statutory interpretation, and common sense.
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INTRODUCTION
Aaron Spoerke enjoyed detonating homemade pipe bombs underwater.1
He did so not to injure anyone, but because he appreciated seeing “a flash
underwater” and feeling “a concussion” that resulted from exploding these
devices.2 On the basis of his intention to use the pipe bombs for innocuous
purposes, Spoerke challenged his conviction3 for making and possessing a
destructive device under the National Firearms Act,4 which defines
“destructive device” as:
1) any explosive, incendiary, or poison gas (A) bomb, (B) grenade, (C)
rocket having a propellant charge of more than four ounces, (D) missile
having an explosive or incendiary charge of more than one-quarter ounce,
(E) mine, or (F) similar device; (2) any type of weapon by whatever name
known which will, or which may be readily converted to, expel a
projectile by the action of an explosive or other propellant, the barrel or
barrels of which have a bore of more than one-half inch in diameter,
except a shotgun or shotgun shell which the Secretary finds is generally
recognized as particularly suitable for sporting purposes; and (3) any
combination of parts either designed or intended for use in converting any
device into a destructive device as defined in subparagraphs (1) and (2)
and from which a destructive device may be readily assembled. The term
1.
2.
3.
4.

United States v. Spoerke, 568 F.3d 1236, 1243 (11th Cir. 2009).
Id.
See id. at 1247.
26 U.S.C. §§ 5801–72 (2006).
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“destructive device” shall not include any device which is neither
designed nor redesigned for use as a weapon . . . .5

In its discussion of the possible import of Spoerke’s subjective intent in
determining whether the device at hand was a statutorily “destructive” one,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit noted a three-way circuit
split on this issue.6 Much of the debate hinges on the appropriate
interpretation of the statute’s use of the word “intended”;7 specifically,
whether—and to what extent—a defendant’s subjective intent may inform
the final determination as to whether a device is “destructive.” Though the
views of the circuit courts are elucidated in far greater detail in Part II of
this Note, a brief overview of the three opinions cited in Spoerke8 is
presented now.
In United States v. Oba,9 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
afforded supreme weight to a defendant’s subjective intent, stating that “a
device may be ‘converted’ into a destructive device as defined in
subparagraphs (1) and (2) by way of ‘design or intent.’”10 According to the
Oba court, even if the item in question would not, by virtue of its objective
characteristics, come within the ambit of subparagraphs (1) or (2), a
defendant’s intent to use that item for a destructive purpose11 can
effectively place it within the Act’s reach.12
In United States v. Posnjak,13 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit stated that generally speaking, a defendant’s subjective intent may
not render “destructive” a device that otherwise would not fall under 26
U.S.C. § 5845(f).14 The court held that it is the objective nature of a device,
and not its user’s intention, which determines whether or not the statute
proscribes it.15 The Posnjak court did, however, allow for the defendant’s
subjective intent to inform this determination in cases involving component
parts which have objective characteristics that leave open the possibility of
conversion into a proscribed or unproscribed device.16
Finally, in United States v. Johnson,17 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit took a stance largely similar, though not identical to, that of

5. Id. § 5845(f).
6. Spoerke, 568 F.3d at 1247–48.
7. See United States v. Posnjak, 457 F.2d 1110, 1119 (2d Cir. 1972).
8. Spoerke, 568 F.3d at 1247–48.
9. 448 F.2d 892 (9th Cir. 1971).
10. Id. at 894. Subparagraphs (1) and (2) discuss explosive devices and weapons,
respectively. 26 U.S.C. § 5845(f).
11. “Destructive purpose” may be defined as using the item unlawfully or selling it to
someone who would use it in that manner. See Posnjak, 457 F.2d at 1118; see also United
States v. Blackwell, 946 F.2d 1049, 1053–54 (4th Cir. 1991) (stating that the malicious
intent of a third party can suffice to provide the requisite intent of the defendant).
12. See Oba, 448 F.2d at 894.
13. 457 F.2d 1110 (2d Cir. 1972).
14. See id. at 1120.
15. See id. at 1116–18.
16. Id. at 1119.
17. 152 F.3d 618 (7th Cir. 1998).
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the Second Circuit.18 It differed from Posnjak only in broadening the scope
of the exception to the rule that excludes evidence of subjective intent.
Namely, Johnson allowed for intent to be relevant both in cases of
unassembled parts and fully assembled devices when the objective
characteristics of such parts or devices do not compel a conclusion as to the
legality of the devices’ eventual use.19
In sum, the Ninth Circuit’s opinion lies on one end of the spectrum,
permitting a defendant’s subjective intent to carry the day regardless of an
item’s objective characteristics.20 The Second Circuit sits at the other end
of the continuum, looking primarily to an item’s objective nature and
considering subjective intent only when dealing with unassembled parts
which the defendant could combine to make either an illicit or a lawful
device.21 The view of the Seventh Circuit—while practically sitting
somewhere in the middle of the spectrum—is conceptually far closer to that
of the Second Circuit. It adopts a similar preference for focusing on an
item’s objective nature. It allows, however, for a slightly wider exception
in allowing a consideration of intent when the characteristics of
unassembled parts or a fully assembled device do not dictate the purposes
for which the item will ultimately be used.22
As there exists a three-way circuit split on this issue, with two of the
courts (the Second and the Seventh circuits) tendering fairly similar
opinions, three illustrative hypotheticals may help to properly convey the
precise stances of the three circuit courts.
First, consider a case in which all three courts would agree that the
defendant’s intentions are relevant in determining whether a destructive
device is present. For example, a defendant found in possession of empty
bottles and a can of gasoline may have stated that he intended to use these
items to make fire bombs and Molotov cocktails to bomb a particular
location.23 Here, the items at issue are unassembled and could be combined
to form either an innocuous or a destructive device.24 Accordingly, all
three courts, even the Second Circuit, would allow for the defendant’s
intentions to be a “central issue”25 in such a case.26
18. Id. at 627.
19. See id.
20. See supra notes 9–12 and accompanying text.
21. See supra notes 13–16 and accompanying text.
22. See supra notes 17–19 and accompanying text. One may alternatively approach this
split through the following set of questions: first, do an item’s objective characteristics point
to its inclusion or exclusion under the National Firearms Act? If so, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit may consider the defendant’s intentions, but the Second and
Seventh would not. If not, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (and surely the
Ninth) would allow for such a consideration. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, however, would then ask whether the item in question consisted of unassembled
component parts or was a fully assembled device. If it is the former, the court may consider
intent to be relevant; if the latter, it may not.
23. This hypothetical is based on the facts of United States v. Davis, 313 F. Supp. 710
(D. Conn. 1970), a case referenced by the Posnjak court as one in which the defendant’s
subjective intent was “a central issue.” Posnjak, 457 F.2d at 1119.
24. See Posnjak, 457 F.2d at 1119.
25. See id.
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The next case would involve a fully assembled device for which an
objective inquiry is not dispositive in determining whether the device is
statutorily destructive.27 Here, the Second Circuit would hold that
subjective intent is not relevant, since this is not a case of unassembled
parts.28 The Seventh and Ninth circuits, however, would hold that the court
may consider the defendant’s intent in determining whether the device is a
statutorily destructive one.
Finally, there is the case where a defendant possessed commercial
dynamite and professed his intentions to use it for harm. In these cases, the
item lacks the objectively “destructive” characteristics;29 accordingly, the
Second and Seventh Circuits would exclude evidence of the defendant’s
intentions from their determinations of destructiveness. The Ninth Circuit,
however, would allow the defendant’s intent alone to render the item
destructive, thereby placing it within the statute’s reach.
Though the cases that produced this circuit split are decades old, this
issue has immediate relevance for several reasons. Perhaps most obvious is
the ease with which one can obtain both the materials and information
needed to construct a destructive device. A recent Google search for
“destructive devices for sale” returned over 75,000 hits.30 A similar search
for “how to build a homemade bomb” produced 575,000 results.31 The
advent of BlackBerrys and smartphones have rendered the internet an
increasingly powerful tool for obtaining and utilizing potentially dangerous
information and materials. Accordingly, defining an accurate and effective
legal standard in cases involving destructive devices is a critically important
endeavor.
Also relevant is the recently proposed Firearm Licensing and Record of
Sale Act of 2009.32 This bill seeks to amend certain parts of the U.S. Code

26. Each circuit court, regardless of its stance on the import of intent in more niche
scenarios, would be bound by the statute to consider intent in this case. See 26 U.S.C.
§ 5845(f)(3) (2006) (including within the statute “any combination of parts . . . intended for
use in converting any device into a destructive device as defined in subparagraphs (1) and
(2) and from which a destructive device may be readily assembled”)
27. The device at issue in Spoerke, a fully assembled one which could be used for
destructive or nondestructive purposes, would likely fall under this category. See supra
note 4.
28. According to the Second Circuit, therefore, possession of such an item would not
result in a violation of § 5845.
29. Senator Thomas Dodd, the spearhead for the relevant gun control legislation of the
1960s, stated that he intended to “specifically exclude[]” from the statute’s reach items such
as commercial dynamite. 114 CONG. REC. 12448 (1968).
30. Destructive
Devices
for
Sale,
GOOGLE,
http://www.google.com/
#hl=en&source=hp&q=destructive+devices+for+sale&aq=0&aqi=g2&oq=destructive+devic
es+&fp=cbc2f75bf9d43a8f (last visited Oct. 23, 2010).
31. How
to
Build
a
Homemade
Bomb,
GOOGLE,
http://www.google.com/#hl=en&source=hp&q=how+to+build+a+homemeade+bomb&aq=f
&aqi=&oq=&fp=cbc2f75bf9d43a8fUS:official&client=firefox-a (last visited Oct. 23, 2010).
32. H.R. 45, 111th Cong. (2009).
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related to the present discussion.33 Moreover, the professed purposes of the
bill invoke the same public safety issues which underlie this issue.34
Lastly, but perhaps most significantly, is President Barack Obama’s
recent withdrawal of American troops from Iraq in August of 201035 and
similar plans to exit Afghanistan by the end of 2011.36 Much of the initial
gun control legislation discussed in this Note targeted the increase in
imported firearms, many of which were post-World War I surplus,37 and
one may surmise that these military withdrawals will yield a similar
surplus.
Part I.A of this Note discusses the development and legislative history of
the National Firearms Act and other relevant legislation. Part I.B considers
generally the role of mens rea in National Firearms Act cases.
Part II of this Note expounds on the aforementioned split between the
Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits. Part II.A.1 discusses the rationale
proffered by the Ninth Circuit, while Part II.A.2 presents other cases which
comport conceptually with the Ninth Circuit’s stance. Parts II.B and II.C
follow identical structures for the Second and Seventh Circuits,
respectively.
Part III argues that the approach adopted by the Second Circuit is most
consistent with the wording of the statute as well as its legislative history,
both of which indicate a preference toward limiting the statute’s scope and
excluding from it items with potentially lawful uses. It further argues that
the Second Circuit’s stance is more logical than those of the other two
circuit courts.

33. See id.
34. One such purpose is “to restrict the availability of qualifying firearms to criminals,
youths, and other persons prohibited by Federal law from receiving firearms.” Id. § 2(c)(3).
Another is “to protect the public against the unreasonable risk of injury and death associated
with the unrecorded sale or transfer of qualifying firearms to criminals and youth.” Id.
§ 2(c)(1).
35. Facts and Figures on Drawdown in Iraq, THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF THE PRESS
SECRETARY (August 2, 2010), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/facts-and-figuresdrawdown-iraq.
36. President Barack Obama, Address at United States Military Academy at West Point,
New York (Dec. 1, 2009).
37. See William J. Vizzard, The Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV.
79 (1999); see also infra notes 79–86 and accompanying text. See generally Franklin E.
Zimring, Firearms and Federal Law: The Gun Control Act of 1968, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 133,
135 (1975).
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I. LAYING THE FOUNDATION: A GENERAL HISTORY OF FEDERAL
FIREARMS REGULATION AND THE ROLE OF MENS REA IN NATIONAL
FIREARMS ACT CASES
A. The Development of Early Federal Firearms Regulation
Many of the cases which this Note discusses give considerable attention
to the legislative history of the National Firearms Act.38 Accordingly, a
discussion of this legislative history is critical for grasping the arguments
proffered by the circuit courts. Moreover, this Note’s conclusion invokes
much of this legislative history in developing its rationale. Consequently,
Part I.A of this Note traces the legislative development of the National
Firearms Act. Part I.A.1 discusses the original National Firearms Act of
1934, while Part I.A.2 focuses on the passage of the Gun Control Act of
1968, which amended the 1934 Act. Part I.A.3 then discusses the structure
and professed purposes of the amended National Firearms Act.
1. The 1934 National Firearms Act’s Historical Background and
Legislative History
State and local attempts to regulate firearms date back to the early
nineteenth century.39 Substantial legislative activity occurred between 1880
and 1915, but due to a lack of external pressure, the federal government
made no attempts at regulation.40 The first federal action pertaining to gun
control was a federal excise tax on firearms and ammunition,41 first
imposed in 1919.42
Following World War I, concern with urban crime and handgun use
began to develop, producing further local firearms regulation and fueling
the fires of debate regarding federal regulation.43 In 1927, Congress passed
the Mailing of Firearms Act,44 prohibiting the sale of firearms through the
mail.45 Though this legislative activity seems to evince a particular concern
for gun control, there is little evidence that this was a visible public issue at
the time.46 Rather, the main public concern was curtailing crime and

38. See, e.g., United States v. Anderson, 885 F.2d 1248 (5th Cir. 1989); United States v.
Peterson, 475 F.2d 806, 811 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Oba, 448 F.2d 892, 900–01
(9th Cir. 1971).
39. Zimring, supra note 37, at 135.
40. Id.
41. I.R.C. § 4181 (2006).
42. ROBERT J. SPITZER, THE POLITICS OF GUN CONTROL 103 (Chatham House Publishers,
2d ed. 1998). Though this tax was primarily fiscally motivated, its legislative history does
imply a concern for gun regulation. See Zimring, supra note 37, at 135.
43. Zimring, supra note 37, at 135.
44. 18 U.S.C. § 1715 (1927).
45. See id. This prohibition’s general ineffectiveness eventually culminated in the 1968
Gun Control Act’s near-total ban on transactions of this sort. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 921–31;
Zimring, supra note 37, at 136.
46. See Zimring, supra note 37, at 136.
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incarcerating criminals.47 The general public viewed firearm regulation as
one small component of the much larger issue of crime.48
By the early 1930s gangsterism had become a prevalent problem in
America.49 Public concern had shifted to the “machine-gun-toting
interstate gangster personified by John Dillinger.”50 The submachine gun
had taken on a prominent role in the public eye and had become “a natural
candidate for public fear and legislative wrath.”51
President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s first Attorney General, Homer
Cummings, blazed the path of gun control legislation.52 His efforts
culminated in two pieces of federal legislation, the National Firearms Act of
1934 (the National Act)53 and the Federal Firearms Act of 1938 (the
Federal Act),54 both of which served to establish a federal role in firearms
regulation.55
The National Firearms Act regulated civilian ownership of numerous
devices that had gained reputations as gangster weapons.56 Its form derived
from the Harrison Narcotics Act,57 and the source of its power was the tax it
imposed on traffic in weapons.58 The National Act was not intended to be
an outright ban on firearms.59 For fear that the U.S. Supreme Court would
strike down such a ban as unconstitutional, Congress took a narrower
approach, opting instead to merely require registration of certain firearms.60

47. Id.
48. Id.
49. SPITZER, supra note 42, at 104.
50. Zimring, supra note 37, at 137.
51. Id. at 137.
52. Id. at 138.
53. 26 U.S.C. §§ 5801–5872 (2006).
54. Pub. L. No. 75-850, 52 Stat. 1250 (2006).
55. These acts also laid the groundwork for the Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No.
90-618, 82 Stat. 1213.
56. Zimring, supra note 37, at 138. The National Firearms Act served as a forerunner to
the Gun Control Act in two significant ways. It put the government in the business of
overseeing firearms licensing and manufacturing, and it used the taxing power to center
enforcement responsibility in the Department of the Treasury. Id. at 139.
57. Pub. L. No. 223, 38 Stat. 785 (1914).
58. Zimring, supra note 37, at 138. This also explains why the Act is located in the
Internal Revenue Code. Martin Lefevour, 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) Requires Mens Rea as to the
Physical Characteristics of the Weapon, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1136, 1138 n.17
(1995).
59. David T. Hardy, The Firearms Owners’ Protection Act: A Historical and Legal
Perspective, 17 CUMB. L. REV. 585, 590–91 (1987).
60. Id. at 592 n.34. Attorney General Homer Cummings’s specific concern was the
Act’s lack of connection with revenue or interstate commerce. National Firearms Act:
Hearings on H.R. 9066 Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 73d Cong. 6 (1934).
This fact affected Congress’s decision to model the Act after the Harrison Narcotic Act, Pub.
L. No. 223, 38 Stat. 785 (1914), which had already been upheld as constitutional. See United
States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86, 94–95 (1919); Hearings on H.R. 9066 Before the Comm. on
Ways and Means, 73d Cong. 4, 6 (1934) (statement of Attorney General Cummings); Hardy,
supra note 59, at 591; see also United States v. Homa, 441 F. Supp. 330, 332 (D. Colo.
1977) (“What must be registered [under the National Firearms Act] are those devices which
are of such a nature that they are inherently inimical to the public safety if they are freely
possessed by private persons in an open society.”).
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Records indicate that the Act was fairly effective; there were fewer
incidents involving submachine guns after its passage than there were prior
to it.61 However, the available data to support this conclusion is limited.62
Moreover, it is possible that the use of these weapons reached an unnatural
peak right before the Act’s passage and would have abated even without
it.63
The Federal Act, Attorney General Cummings’s other major legislative
effort, served to “spread a thin coat of regulation over all firearms and many
classes of ammunition suitable for handguns.”64 The Federal Act aimed to
prevent what was widely considered society’s “criminal class” from
obtaining firearms, but was generally ineffective in accomplishing its
professed goals.65 Two loopholes in the Federal Act are particularly salient
as they eventually determined the shape of the Gun Control Act.66 One was
the relative ease with which citizens could obtain dealer’s licenses.67 The
other was the ability for citizens who lived in a state which required
licenses to simply purchase firearms in a state with no license
requirement.68
Further hindering the Act’s effectiveness was the minimal policing of
dealer compliance and the lack of a serial number requirement on
firearms.69 Additionally, dealers continued to enjoy immunity from
prosecution because they did not have to verify their customers’ eligibility
to purchase guns.70
Moreover, the government expended considerably few resources in
The statistics paint an
enforcing the newly enacted legislation.71
overwhelmingly clear picture: in 1938, the government invested a total of
thirty-five man-years to enforce the two acts.72 Between the late 1930s and
early 1960s, it made less than one hundred arrests per year on the basis of
this legislation.73
Yet despite these practical shortcomings, Congress accomplished much
of what it wanted with these acts: “a symbolic denunciation of firearms in
the hands of criminals . . . [and a] regulatory scheme that did not
inconvenience the American firearms industry or its customers.”74 After
Attorney General Cummings’s departure in 1939, attempts to expand the
existing legislation faded.75 Violent crime rates had been in decline since
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Zimring, supra note 37, at 139.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 140.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 140–41.
Id. at 141.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 142.
Id.
SPITZER, supra note 42, at 105.
Zimring, supra note 37, at 143.
Id.
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the mid-1930s, and issues such as war and the post-Depression economic
recovery occupied much of the public’s attention.76
Between 1938 and 1957, Congress displayed almost no interest in
enacting new gun control legislation.77 Most of the attempts at regulation
of firearms during this period came from the Executive Branch and the
general public, and were largely unsuccessful.78
2. Time for a Change: The Gun Control Act of 1968
The first indication that the federal government would further regulate
firearms came in the mid-1950s.79 Inexpensive imported firearms, mostly
military surplus, began to enter the American firearms market.80 Between
1955 and 1958, the number of imported rifles available for domestic sale
rose from 15,000 to 200,000.81 In response, then-Senator John F. Kennedy
proposed legislation to curb the importation of surplus military weapons.82
Congress’s ban, however, only reached previously exported military
firearms.83 Fueled largely by surplus World War II firearms, the flood of
imported guns continued.84
Once again, the statistics are extremely compelling: 1955 brought about
the import for sale of 67,000 handguns to American civilians.85 This figure
rose to 130,000 in 1959, 500,000 in 1966, and 1,000,000 by 1968.86 This
dramatic increase notwithstanding, the imported handgun was particularly
vulnerable to legislative regulation.87 The imported handgun was cheap
and thus widely available, not used for sport or law enforcement—and thus
had no redeeming social value—and its importers had far less political sway
than did domestic gun manufacturers.88
Perhaps the most influential gun control advocate of this era was Senator
Thomas Dodd of Connecticut.89 Upon being named Chairman of the
Juvenile Justice Committee of the Senate Judiciary Center in 1961, Senator
Dodd ordered a study of mail order sales of firearms.90 Armed with this
study, Senator Dodd introduced his first gun control bill in 196391 and
initiated hearings to generate public interest.92 Following the assassination
of President Kennedy in late 1963, Senator Dodd amended his bill to
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id.
Id.
SPITZER, supra note 42, at 104.
Zimring, supra note 37, at 144.
Id.
Id.
S. 3714, 85th Cong. (1958); see also Vizzard, supra note 37, at 79.
Id.
Id.; see also supra notes 32–34 and accompanying text.
Zimring, supra note 37, at 144.
Id.
Id. at 145.
Id.
Id. Notably, Connecticut was a major gun-producing state. Id.
Vizzard, supra note 37, at 80.
S. 1975, 87th Cong. (1963).
Vizzard, supra note 37, at 80.
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include mail order traffic in rifles and shotguns.93 The bill died on the
Senate floor in 1964.94
In 1965, following a message sent by President Lyndon B. Johnson that
requested Congress take an increased role in federal firearms regulation, the
Treasury staff drafted Senate Bill 1592.95 Truly a predecessor for
upcoming legislation, the bill contained many of the key elements of the
Gun Control Act of 1968.96 Senator Dodd introduced a similar bill97 in
January of 1967. In response to administration proposals, this bill
underwent a series of amendments and became known as Amendment 90 to
Senate Bill 1.98 It extended the prohibition on interstate mail order sales
A
and prohibited all interstate transactions between individuals.99
companion bill proposed by Senator Roman Hruska placed destructive
devices under the National Firearms Act as requiring registration and tax
payment.100
Though the bill passed in the Senate less than one month later,101 passage
in the House of Representatives remained an obstacle.102 The June 5, 1968
assassination of Senator Robert Kennedy, however, assured House
passage.103 Surprisingly, this Act never became effective because, in the
aftermath of Senator Kennedy’s assassination, Congress replaced it with the
more comprehensive Gun Control Act.104
The Gun Control Act amended the National Firearms Act to broaden the
class of restricted items to cover destructive devices.105 It also extended
interstate restrictions to all firearms and brought ammunition under the Gun
Control Act’s coverage.106 While Title IV contained the immediately
relevant section of the Act,107 the rest of the Act was similarly aimed
towards helping local law enforcement curb incidents of crime.108 To this
end, the other four sections pertained to crime control means such as law
93. THOMAS DODD, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY UNITED STATES
SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE JUVENILE DELINQUENCY PURSUANT TO S. RES. 63, S.
REP. NO. 88-1608 (1968).
94. Zimring, supra note 37, at 146.
95. Id. The proposed bill was S. 1592, 89th Cong. (1st Sess. 1965).
96. Zimring, supra note 37, at 146.
97. S. 1, 90th Cong. (1st Sess. 1967).
98. Vizzard, supra note 37, at 82.
99. Amend. 90 to S. 1, 90th Cong. (1st Sess. 1967) (as intended to be proposed by Sen.
Dodd, 1967).
100. S. 1854, 90th Cong. (1st Sess. 1967).
101. Title IV contained the immediately relevant section of the Act. Like Title IV, the
rest of the Act was aimed towards helping local law enforcement curb incidents of crime. S.
REP. NO. 90-1097, at 1–2 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112. To this end, the
other four sections pertained to crime control means such as law enforcement assistance,
admissibility of confessions, and wiretapping. See id.
102. Vizzard, supra note 37, at 83.
103. Id.
104. Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213 (1968).
105. Id; see also H.R. REP. NO. 90-1956, at 14–15 (1968) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1968
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4426.
106. Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213 (1968).
107. See S. REP. NO. 10-1097, at 183 (1968).
108. Id. at 30.
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enforcement assistance, admissibility of confessions, and wiretapping.109
This was the last major gun control act to pass Congress until the 1986
Firearms Owners’ Protection Act.110
3. A Deeper Look into the Amended National Firearms Act’s Structure and
Purposes
The Gun Control Act contains two distinct subdivisions, each located in
different sections of the federal code. Title 18 of the United States Code
contains Title I of the Gun Control Act, which regulates all firearms.111
Title 26 of the Code contains Title II,112 which incorporates the prior
National Firearms Act while making minor additions; most notably, the
inclusion of “destructive devices” within the definition of firearms.113 The
amended National Firearms Act, though possessing clear criminal
implications, remained a tax statute; hence its location in the Internal
Revenue Code.114
Though clearly curbing the availability of firearms to American citizens,
the Gun Control Act in fact reflects a compromise between two highly
polarized camps.115 During the debates preceding the passage of the Act,
two distinct gun control strategies emerged.116 One was the creation of
federal jurisdiction and mandatory prison sentences for violent crimes
committed with guns.117 The proponents of this approach were generally
the opponents of gun control who were seeking a realistic alternative to
stricter measures.118 A second approach called for a system of federal
firearms owner registration or licensing.119 The final version of the Gun
Control Act contains elements of each, and thus, like the Federal Firearms
Act of 1938, represents a compromise position between those who
supported further gun control and those who opposed it.120
The preamble to the Gun Control Act provides that its purpose is to assist
in the fight against crime and violence121 without placing any undue

109. Id. at 213–14.
110. Pub. L. No. 99-308, 100 Stat. 449 (1986).
111. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 922–30 (2006).
112. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 5801–72.
113. Vizzard, supra note 37, at 86.
114. Id; see also supra notes 57–58 and accompanying text. The statute’s location in the
United States Code has practical ramifications pertaining to the extent to which courts apply
the rule of lenity. See United States v. Thompson/Center Arms Co., 504 U.S. 505, 517–18
(1992).
115. See Zimring, supra note 37, at 147.
116. See id.
117. See id.
118. See id.
119. See id.
120. See id.
121. This concern notwithstanding, a National Firearms Act offense centers around the
possession of a device, not its use, despite the fact that “danger from a pipe bomb comes not
from the offense of possession, but from the added factor of use.” See United States v. Hull,
456 F.3d 133, 139 (3d Cir. 2006). Mere possession of a pipe bomb does not necessarily
include a substantial risk that the possessor will use it. Id. at 140; see also United States v.
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burdens on law-abiding citizens.122 These ideals pervade the entire Act123
as well as the policy discussion which surrounded it.124
The Gun Control Act contains three specific objectives.125 One is
assisting local efforts to license, register, and restrict ownership of guns by
eliminating the interstate traffic in firearms and ammunition.126 A second is
denying access to firearms to certain groups such as minors and felons.127
Finally, the Act aims to end the importation of surplus military firearms.128
Senator Dodd submitted a report in support of the Act129 which further
illuminated some of its underlying motivations. Senator Dodd stated that
destructive devices “are primarily weapons of war which have no
appropriate use . . . .”130 He further declared as one of the principal
purposes of the Act a desire to keep firearms out of the hands of those not
entitled to possess them.131 Yet he clearly delineated that “[i]t is not the
purpose of the act to place any undue or unnecessary restrictions or burdens
on responsible law-abiding citizens with respect to . . . any . . . lawful
activity.”132
Senator Dodd also discussed the grave implications of Haynes v. United
States,133 which effectively rendered useless the section of the United States
Code134 which the government had previously used for National Firearms
Act prosecutions.135 In Haynes, the defendant pled guilty to possession of

Lane, 252 F.3d 905, 907 (7th Cir. 2001) (distinguishing a crime that increases the likelihood
of violence from a crime of violence).
122. Pub. L. No. 90-618 § 101, 82 Stat. 1213 (1968) (“[T]his title is not intended to
discourage or eliminate the private ownership or use of firearms by law-abiding citizens for
lawful purposes . . . .”)
123. Vizzard, supra note 37, at 89.
124. Id. at 94 (stating that advocates repeatedly discussed the correlation between gunrelated murder and crime rates, as well as that between crime rates and strong gun control
laws in other countries).
125. Zimring, supra note 37, at 149.
126. See S. REP. NO. 90-1501, at 23 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4426; H.R.
REP. NO. 90-1956, at 1 (1968) (Conf. Rep.); see also Zimring, supra note 37, at 149.
127. See S. REP. NO. 90-1501, at 23; Zimring, supra note 37, at 149.
128. See S. REP. NO. 90-1501, at 24; Zimring, supra note 37, at 149.
129. S. REP NO. 90-1501.
130. Id. at 1. Notably, Senator Dodd used this fact as a justification for regulation of
destructive devices. Id. at 28 (“[D]estructive devices . . . are primarily weapons of war and
have no appropriate sporting use . . . therefore, it is necessary to control all commerce in
them.”).
131. Id. at 22.
132. Id.; see also Jay M. Zitter, Validity, Construction, and Application of Provisions of
National Firearms Act (26 U.S.C.S. § 5845(f)) and Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act (18 U.S.C.S. § 921(a)(4)) Defining “Destructive Device”, 126 A.L.R. FED. 597 (1995).
133. 390 U.S. 85 (1968).
134. 26 U.S.C. § 5851 (2006).
135. S. REP. NO. 90-1501, at 26; see also 114 CONG. REC. 26715–17 (Sep. 12, 1968)
(remarks of Sen. Dodd) (noting the inadequacy of former gun control regulation); H.R. REP.
NO. 90-1577, at 7 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4426 (“The subject legislation
responds to widespread national concern that existing Federal control over the sale and
shipment of firearms [across] State lines is grossly inadequate.”); SPITZER, supra note 42, at
105 (noting that between the 1930s and 1960s, fewer than one hundred arrests per year were
made based on such legislation).
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unregistered firearms under sections 5841 and 5851.136 The Supreme Court
found that these sections’ firearms registration requirements were “directed
principally at those persons who have obtained possession of a firearm
without complying with the Act’s other requirements.”137 It noted that the
requirement to register violations under sections 5841 and 5851 greatly
increased the likelihood of prosecution.138 The Court therefore concluded
that “a proper claim of the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination
provides a full defense to prosecutions” under sections 5841 and 5851.139
Part of the Gun Control Act’s purpose was to overcome the Haynes
obstacle.140
Congress also explicitly discussed destructive devices. Senator Roman
Hruska noted that one of the major effects of the legislation would be
placing destructive devices within the definition of firearms.141 Senator
Dodd stated that there was no apparent rationale for precluding such
devices from the National Firearms Act’s definition.142 He proceeded to
state that while he did not intend to proscribe legitimate articles of
commerce, very few legitimate sportsmen own destructive devices such as
antipersonnel tanks or bazookas.143
B. The Role of Mens Rea in National Firearms Act Cases
As the circuit split speaks to the issue of a defendant’s intent in National
Firearms Act cases, the next step in properly evaluating the split is an
analysis of the general mens rea requirement in such prosecutions.144 This
section lays the groundwork for the later discussion of subjective intent per
26 U.S.C. § 5845(f). Moreover, this analysis provides further illumination
into the congressional motives which prompted the relevant legislation.
1. Pre-Staples Cases
In United States v. Freed,145 the Supreme Court held that the National
Firearms Act requires no specific intent146 that firearms be unregistered.147
The only knowledge required for a conviction was that the instrument was a

136. Haynes, 390 U.S. at 86.
137. Id. at 96.
138. Id. at 97.
139. Id. at 100.
140. S. REP. NO. 90-1501, at 26.
141. 114 CONG REC. 26900 (1968).
142. Id. at 12448.
143. Id.; see supra note 29 and accompanying text.
144. Mens rea is defined as a guilty mind: “[t]he state of mind that the prosecution, to
secure a conviction, must prove that a defendant had when committing a crime” BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY 1075 (9th ed. 2009).
145. 401 U.S. 601 (1971).
146. Specific intent is the intent to commit the specific criminal act with which one is
later charged. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 882 (9th. ed. 2009).
147. Freed, 401 U.S. at 607; see also United States v. Urban, 140 F.3d 229, 231–34 (3d
Cir. 1998) (rejecting a specific intent requirement, despite the statute’s reference to “any
combination of parts either designed or intended for use”).
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firearm.148 The Court referred to the National Firearms Act as “a
regulatory measure in the interest of the public safety, which may well be
premised on the theory that . . . possession of hand grenades is not an
innocent act.”149
The Court equated the instant case with United States v. Balint,150 in
which the Court convicted the defendant of selling narcotics, despite his
claims that he did not know that a federal act proscribed them.151 There,
the Court noted that Congress compared the prospect of convicting an
innocent seller against the evil of exposing innocent citizens to perils of
drugs, and chose to avoid the latter.152 That the Court invoked this
reasoning in Freed implies that it viewed the possibility of convicting
individuals unaware that they are in possession of unregistered firearms as
insignificant in light of the National Firearms Act’s aim of ensuring public
safety.
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. concurred in Freed153 and elucidated the
majority’s conclusions on this issue.154 To convict a defendant under the
National Firearms Act, the government must prove three things: that the
defendant possessed certain items, that those items were firearms, and that
the items were unregistered.155 While the last provision requires no proof
of intent, the first two do have such requirements, thus preventing the
National Firearms Act from creating a crime of strict liability.156
Justice Brennan’s comments speak to his opinion on the nature of the
National Firearms Act. The Act is intended to cover “major” weapons such
as sawed-off shotguns and machineguns.157 Justice Brennan viewed the
likelihood of regulation of these weapons as great enough to obviate the
intent requirement as per the unregistered status element of the offense.158
For twelve years after Freed, every federal court which encountered this
question held that the only mens rea required in this context was that
defendants had a “general sense” that they possessed a firearm.159 The
Ninth Circuit in United States v. Herbert160 was the first court to break this
trend, holding that the government must prove the defendants knew of
internal characteristics that rendered a device a “firearm” when nothing

148. Freed, 401 U.S. at 607.
149. Id. at 609.
150. 258 U.S. 250 (1922).
151. See id.
152. See id. at 254. The Balint court felt that when a statute aims to promote public
welfare, and proving intent would hinder prosecution, the government need not prove that
defendants knew their activities were illegal. Id. at 252–53.
153. Freed, 401 U.S. at 610 (Brennan, J., concurring).
154. See id.
155. See id. at 612.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 616.
158. See id.
159. Lefevour, supra note 58, at 1140.
160. 698 F.2d 981 (9th Cir. 1983).
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external would have alerted them to the likelihood of regulation.161 This
decision precipitated a trend of circuit court splits on this issue.162
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit addressed this issue in
United States v. Anderson.163 It held that the lack of an explicit mens rea
requirement in the National Firearms Act does not translate into this
requirement being disposed of as a precondition for National Firearms Act
prosecutions.164
The Anderson court discussed the contrast between the dictionary
definition of a firearm and that proffered by the National Firearms Act.165
It noted that there is only a narrow overlap between the colloquial and legal
definitions of the term.166 The court thus concluded that—in regards to
devices that look like firearms as per the ordinary meaning of the word but
not as per the Act, yet are indeed statutory “firearms,”—a conviction
requires the defendant’s knowledge of the latter.167 Consequently, if a
defendant is in possession of a non-regulated firearm,168 and unbeknownst
to him, the weapon was modified or eroded into one which falls under the
Act, the intent requirement of the Act would not be fulfilled.169
While the majority’s opinion was largely based on its interpretation of
Freed, the dissent read Freed as implying that the National Firearms Act
does not require knowledge of a weapon’s characteristics.170 It argued that
a possessor’s knowledge “that a grenade is a grenade and is a highly
dangerous weapon, the possession of which might be unlawful” would
suffice for a conviction.171 The mere ownership of legal weapons requires
knowledge of those weapons’ characteristics.172
Judge Jerry Smith supported his dissent by noting that there are very few,
if any, National Firearms Act cases which punish a truly “innocent” gun
owner.173 The Act typically comes into play in cases of gangsters and
terrorists; as such, Judge Smith deemed the majority’s concern regarding

161. Id. at 987. The conviction in Herbert involved weapons which were designed as
semi-automatic guns and subsequently converted to fully automatic ones. Id. at 983. The
National Firearms Act covers fully automatic weapons—which fire multiple shots with only
one trigger pull—but not semi-automatics. See Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 602
n.1 (1994).
162. Lefevour, supra note 58, at 1140.
163. 885 F.2d 1248 (5th Cir. 1989).
164. Id. at 1253.
165. Id. at 1250–51 (noting that the Act’s definition serves to narrow the meaning of
“firearm” in most respects, but to expand it in some regards as well).
166. “[K]nowing or proving that a thing is a firearm in the ordinary sense of the term tells
almost nothing about whether it is a ‘firearm’ for purposes of the Act . . . .” Id. at 1251.
167. Id.
168. The court noted that the Act treats “conventionally manufactured” weapons as
perfectly legal items. Id. at 1254.
169. See id.
170. Id. at 1256 (Smith, J., dissenting).
171. Id. at 1257.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 1261.
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the prosecution of innocent citizens as misplaced.174 Judge Smith also
noted that the 1986 Firearms Owners’ Protection Act175 added scienter
requirements to related statutes,176 but did not do so in relation to the
National Firearms Act.177
2. Staples v. United States
The Supreme Court revisited the intent question in Staples v. United
States.178 There, the government charged the defendant with the possession
of an unregistered machinegun179 in violation of section 5861(d) of the
National Firearms Act.180 Staples claimed that the gun never fired
automatically in his possession and that he was ignorant of this
capability.181 He argued that his ignorance should protect him from
criminal liability for failing to register the gun.182
The Court noted the statute’s failure to address mens rea.183 Like the
Anderson majority,184 it refused to interpret this silence as disposing of a
mens rea requirement.185 It referred to the common law principle that
requires some level of mens rea for a crime.186 Only in cases involving
“public welfare” or “regulatory” crimes—a category into which the
government prosecutors claimed Staples’ conviction fell—may the court
construe congressional silence as eliminating a mens rea requirement.187

174. Id. at 1261–62. The dissent also cited Sipes v. United States, 321 F.2d 174, 176 (8th
Cir. 1963) which stated that the purpose of firearm regulation was to make it more difficult
for gangsters to obtain weapons.
175. Pub. L. No. 99-308, 100 Stat. 449 (1986).
176. 18 U.S.C. §§ 922, 924 (2006).
177. 885 F.2d at 1261 n.7 (Smith, J., dissenting).
178. 511 U.S. 600 (1994). Before Staples, there was considerable conflict in federal
courts on the issue of mens rea in this context. See Russell G. Donaldson, Annotation, What
Constitutes Actual or Constructive Possession of Unregistered or Otherwise Prohibited
Firearm in Violation of 26 U.S.C.A. § 5861, 133 A.L.R. FED. 347, 366 (1996). Cases such as
Freed held that in order to uphold a conviction, the prosecution must merely show that the
defendant had knowledge that the proscribed item exists, and that it was within his
possession, but not that it required federal registration. Many others, meanwhile, held that
the defendant must at least know of the general nature of the item possessed which places it
under the statutory definition of a “firearm.” See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 477 F.2d 399,
401 (8th Cir. 1973). Still, other courts required knowledge of particular features which
render the device a statutory “firearm.” See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 959 F.2d 246 (D.C.
Cir. 1992); see also United States v. Poulos, 895 F.2d 1113 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding that a
conviction requires a defendant to have known that the item was likely to be subject to
federal regulation).
179. The gun in question was a semi-automatic rifle which had been modified for fully
automatic fire. See Staples, 511 U.S. at 603; supra notes 160–61.
180. Staples, 511 U.S. at 603.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 605.
184. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
185. Staples, 511 U.S. at 605.
186. Id.
187. See id. at 606. In such situations, as long as a defendant knows he is dealing with a
dangerous device that places him “‘in responsible relation to a public danger,’” he should be

580

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

The government supported its stance by citing Freed, in which the Court
referred to the National Firearms Act as “a regulatory measure in the
interest of the public safety.”188 The Staples Court, however, refused to
analogize Staples with Freed.189 It stated that the analysis in Freed, a case
involving hand grenades, was based on the assumption that the defendant
knew he possessed a dangerous weapon—a weapon within the statutory
definition of a “firearm,” the possession of which was not innocent.190 In
Staples, however, “the very question to be decided is whether the defendant
must know of the particular characteristics that make his weapon a statutory
firearm.”191
The Staples Court thus held that it could not analogize the instant case,
one involving guns, to Freed.192 Rather, it compared Staples to Liparota v.
United States,193 a case involving the unlawful possession of food
stamps.194 There, the Court held that the statute required proof that the
defendant knew his possession of food stamps was unauthorized.195 The
Court’s decision not to characterize the statute as a public welfare law
rested on the fact that a “food stamp can hardly be compared to a hand
grenade.”196
The Court in Staples held that the same could be said of guns.197 As
opposed to hand grenades, there is a long history of lawful gun ownership
in America.198 The crux of the Court’s decision in Freed, that “‘one would
hardly be surprised to learn that possession of hand grenades is not an
innocent act,’” could not rightly be extended to Staples.199 This extension
in the Staples Court’s view, “is simply not supported by common
experience.”200 The Court stated that unlike grenades, guns can be owned
in perfect innocence.201 It stated that roughly fifty percent of American
homes contain at least one firearm.202 In most states, buying a shotgun or
rifle “would not alert a person to regulation any more than would buying a
car.”203

“alerted to the probability of strict regulation” Id. at 607 (quoting United States v.
Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 281 (1943)).
188. United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 609 (1971).
189. See Staples, 511 U.S. at 609.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. See id. at 610.
193. 471 U.S. 419 (1985).
194. Staples, 511 U.S. at 610.
195. Id.
196. Liparota, 471 U.S. at 433.
197. Staples, 511 U.S. at 610.
198. Id.
199. See id (quoting United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 609 (1971)).
200. Id.; see also id. at 621–22 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (stating that the generally
dangerous nature of guns does not suffice to give defendants cause to inquire about
registration requirements).
201. Id. at 611.
202. Id. at 613–14.
203. Id. at 614.
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Turning to the case at hand, the Court concluded that it was reluctant to
ease the prosecution’s path to conviction of persons such as Staples whose
conduct would not alert them to the probability of strict regulation under
section 5861(d).204 It further supported its stance by citing the penalty of
up to ten years imprisonment attached to such convictions.205 The Court
relied on the principle that penalties can inform whether a statute should be
construed as dispensing with mens rea requirements.206 It stated that public
welfare offenses, which usually carried much lighter penalties, logically
complement the absence of a mens rea requirement.207 Conversely,
offenses punishable by long imprisonment generally do require mens rea.208
The Court thus supported the application of the common law rule favoring a
mens rea requirement in this case.209
Justice John Paul Stevens dissented in Staples. He argued that the
statute’s text does inform the mens rea issue.210 He argued that the text
contains no mens rea requirement, nor does it describe a common law
crime.211 Rather, since the relevant offense was “entirely a creature of
statute,” the background rules of the common law which the majority cited
did not apply.212 Justice Stevens concluded that here, congressional silence
on the mens rea issue dictates that “Congress did not intend to require proof
that the defendant knew all of the facts that made his conduct illegal.”213
Justice Stevens further stated that when Congress initially passed the
statute in 1934, it limited the Act’s coverage to the types of weapons
characteristically used by gangsters.214 Consequently, Congress could have
assumed that those possessing such weapons intended to use them for
criminal purposes; any likelihood of innocent possession was remote.215
Moreover, the Supreme Court had previously interpreted the Harrison
Narcotics Act,216 after which the National Firearms Act was modeled,217
not to require proof of all the facts that constitute an offense in order to
reach a conviction.218
Justice Stevens also disagreed with the majority’s contention that the
National Firearms Act is not a public welfare statute.219 He quoted Freed,
where the Court held the statute to be a “regulatory measure in the interest
204. Id. at 615–16.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 617.
209. Id. at 619.
210. Id. at 625 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens quoted the section of the Act
which makes it “unlawful for any person . . . to receive or possess a firearm which is not
registered to him.” Id.(quoting 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) (2006).
211. Id.
212. See id.
213. Id. at 626.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 626–27.
216. Pub. L. No. 223, 38 Stat. 785 (1914).
217. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
218. Staples, 511 U.S. at 626 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
219. Id. at 630.
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of the public safety.”220 Justice Stevens thus rejected the majority’s “rather
surprising” and “dubious” conclusion that guns are more analogous to food
stamps than to hand grenades.221
Justice Stevens then turned to the history of the National Firearms Act.
He noted that for the first thirty years of the original Act’s existence, courts
did not require knowledge of the characteristics of the weapon that brought
it under the statute’s reach.222 He cited Sipes v. United States,223 in which
then Judge Harry Blackmun stated that a defendant’s knowledge that he
possesses a gun is “all the scienter which the statute requires.”224
Finally, Justice Stevens’s dissent noted that both the 1968 and 1986
amendments to the Act added knowledge requirements to other sections of
the statute.225 However, neither the text nor the history of either
amendment indicates any intent to add such a requirement to the offense for
possession of an unregistered firearm.226 Justice Stevens thus concluded
that a finding that a defendant knowingly possessed a dangerous device that
would alert him to the likelihood of regulation would suffice for a National
Firearms Act conviction.227
II. DOES A DEFENDANT’S SUBJECTIVE INTENT MATTER? THE THREE-WAY
CIRCUIT SPLIT
This part discusses the three subjective intent standards currently applied
by the circuit courts. Each subsection first details the cases cited in
Spoerke228 as giving rise to this split. The subsections then state arguments
proffered by other courts which have reached similar conclusions in
analogous cases. As many of these cases offer arguments that overlap with
those of the three primary cases, such arguments are only discussed once.
A. Subjective Intent Matters: Advocating for a Consideration of the
Defendant’s Intentions
1. United States v. Oba
In 1971, the government charged Richard Oba with possessing and
transferring an unlawfully made firearm.229 His stated intent was to use
dynamite to “dynamite the city of Eugene, Oregon and . . . to bomb and
220. United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 609 (1971); see also supra note 188 and
accompanying text.
221. Staples, 511 U.S. at 631–32 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
222. Id. at 636.
223. 321 F.2d 174 (8th Cir. 1963).
224. Id. at 179.
225. See Pub. L. No. 99-308, 100 Stat. 449 (1986); Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213
(1968); Staples, 511 U.S. at 636 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
226. Staples, 511 U.S. at 636.
227. Id. at 640.
228. United States v. Spoerke, 568 F.3d 1236, 1247–48 (11th Cir. 2009).
229. United States v. Oba, 448 F.2d 892 (9th Cir. 1971). As described in the indictment,
the object was “seven sticks of dynamite wrapped in copper wire and equipped with fuse and
blasting caps.” Id. at 894.
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destroy the property of others.”230 After being charged with violating 26
U.S.C. § 5861(c) and (e), Oba pled guilty.231 He later appealed his
conviction, arguing that the object in question was not a “destructive
device” as per 26 U.S.C. § 5845(f).232
The Oba court stated that “a device may be ‘converted’ into a destructive
device as defined in Subparagraphs (1) and (2) by way of ‘design or
intent.’”233 In light of the characteristics of Oba’s device and its admitted
purpose, the court said it would be “absurd” to question its qualification as
a destructive device.234 Thus, the Ninth Circuit held that a defendant’s
intent weighs heavily in the determination of whether a device is a
“destructive device” under the National Firearms Act.235
2. Additional Cases Advocating a Subjective Standard
In United States v. Peterson,236 the district court convicted the defendants
of possessing a destructive device under section 5845(f).237 The defendants
stated that this device could be used for destroying haystacks, and provided
a list of haystacks they intended to burn and the route they intended to take
in doing so.238
Basing its conclusions on the National Firearms Act’s legislative history,
the Peterson court stated that “Congress was well aware of the rampant
destruction of property and dangers to life and limb faced by the public
through . . . homemade instruments.”239 Therefore, the court felt that
Congress intended to proscribe devices other than military type ordinance
through its inclusion of “destructive devices” in the statute.240 The court
noted that the explicit mention of a category of “similar” devices in addition
to the items specifically named in subparagraph (1)(a)–(f) indicates that
incendiary “destructive devices” are not limited to military weaponry.241
That the statute’s wording and legislative history allow for the inclusion
of homemade devices provided a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for

230. Id. at 894.
231. Id. at 893.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 894.
234. Id. Consequently, the court upheld Oba’s conviction. Id. at 895.
235. See id. at 894–95.
236. 475 F.2d 806 (9th Cir. 1973).
237. Id. at 807. The device in question was a “three to four inch long casing and fuel
segment of a fusee flare . . . from which a portion of the fuel material inside the casing
segment was removed. The removed fuel material was mixed with an equal amount of gun
powder.” This was inserted, along with a piece of cotton rope, into the casing. An explosive
expert with the Treasury Department stated that this device was “highly effective” for use in
destruction of property, and compared it to a Molotov cocktail. Id. at 809.
238. Id. at 809.
239. Id. at 810.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 810–11. Contra United States v. Posnjak, 457 F.2d 1110, 1116 (2d Cir. 1972)
(stating that “[t]he last phrase must logically be taken to mean devices similar to the
preceding enumerated items in that they are articles of military ordinance, not merely that
they . . . are products with some explosive power”).
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upholding Peterson’s conviction. The court stated, however, that “Congress
manifestly intended to proscribe friendly things when with evil intent they
are combined or joined together to produce a hostile object or device.”242 It
concluded that this was precisely what Peterson did.243 Consistent with its
holding in Oba, the Ninth Circuit held that the nature of the device in
question, coupled with the defendant’s “evil intent,” rendered the device
“destructive” for purposes of the National Firearms Act.244
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit’s opinion in United
States v. Morningstar245 also supports a subjective intent inquiry. There,
the prosecution charged the defendant with possession of a destructive
device in violation of the National Firearms Act.246 The district court held
that this device was not a destructive one for the purposes of the Act.247
The circuit court disagreed, holding that the defendant’s intention was
critical in answering the question of whether commercial explosives are
covered by the Act.248 The court analyzed the third subsection of section
5845(f) in reaching this conclusion.249 It first mentioned the statute’s
design provision250 and noted that it serves to proscribe items such as
“unassembled parts of a military fragmentation or incendiary bomb,”
regardless of their intended use.251
The court noted that, had Congress wished to completely exclude
commercial explosives from the Act’s reach, it could have stopped at this
point.252 Yet Congress went on to include combinations of parts “intended
for use in converting any device into a destructive device.”253 According to
the court, this provision compels two conclusions. First, Congress intended
to proscribe more than just gangster-type weapons and military
ordinance.254 Moreover, it dictates that for items falling under the intent
provision, as opposed to those proscribed under the design provision, “the
use for which these materials are intended determines whether they fall
within the Act.”255
The Morningstar court furthered its stance by referring to the Act’s
legislative history.256 It cited a House Report which stated that “this
paragraph excludes certain devices from the definition of ‘destructive
242. Peterson, 475 F.2d at 811.
243. Id.
244. See id.
245. 456 F.2d 278 (4th Cir. 1972).
246. Id. at 279. The device consisted of “black powder pellet explosive and blasting
caps.” Id.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 280 (stating that this issue “must be determined” by the defendant’s
intentions).
249. Id.
250. “[A]ny combination of parts . . . designed . . . for use in converting any device into a
destructive device . . . .” 26 U.S.C. § 5845(f)(3) (1968).
251. Morningstar, 456 F.2d at 280.
252. Id.
253. Id. (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 5845(f)(3) (1968)).
254. Id. at 280–81.
255. Id. at 280.
256. Id. at 281.
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device.’ The devices excluded are those not designed or redesigned or used
or intended for use as a weapon—e.g., construction tools using explosives
when used for such purposes.”257 Thus, the relevant legislative history also
establishes that the purpose for which destructive devices are used may
determine whether they are covered by the National Firearms Act.258
In United States v. Hammond,259 a case from the Eleventh Circuit, the
government charged the defendant with making an unregistered firearm.260
After the jury returned a guilty verdict, the defendant moved for a judgment
of acquittal.261 The district court granted the motion, stating that the
evidence was inadequate to prove that the item was a “destructive device”
under section 5845.262
The Eleventh Circuit stated that a device is not covered by the statute
simply because it explodes.263 Rather, the court noted a distinct “plus
factor;” namely, proof that the device was designed as a weapon.264 A
device is statutorily destructive only if it was designed for use as a
weapon.265
It thus appears that the Eleventh Circuit advocates a stance which looks
beyond a device’s objective characteristics and considers a defendant’s
subjective intent. Concededly, the Hammond court’s opinion centered on
section 5845(f)(3)’s exemption of items not designed for use as a
weapon;266 thus, its context is not identical to that of the other cases which
focus on the statute’s inclusionary clauses.267 Nonetheless, Hammond
repeatedly refers to a “plus factor” which entails looking beyond an item’s
objective characteristics.268
B. The (Primarily) Objective Standard, with a Small Caveat
1. United States v. Posnjak
In 1969, Walter Posnjak contacted an undercover federal agent about the
possibility of selling dynamite.269 The agent informed Posnjak that he was
buying the dynamite on behalf of a Cuban revolutionary group which

257. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 1577 (1968)).
258. See Morningstar, 456 F.2d at 280–81.
259. 371 F.3d 776 (11th Cir. 2004).
260. Id. at 778. The firearm in question was a cardboard tube filled with pyrodex, an
explosive powder, ground pyrodex, and gunpowder, with a fuse running from one end to the
center of the device. Id.
261. Id. at 779.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 780.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id. (“[T]he statute . . . excludes from coverage any explosive device not designed for
use as a weapon.”).
267. Specifically, “design” will likely pertain to the mindset of the item’s maker, while
“intent” will likely relate to that of the possessor.
268. Hammond, 371 F.3d at 780.
269. United States v. Posnjak, 457 F.2d 1110, 1112 (2d Cir. 1972).
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intended to use it to “blow up buildings and people.”270 Over the next
several days, Posnjak and his co-defendant sold 4100 unregistered sticks of
dynamite, along with fuse and caps, to the agent.271
The trial court instructed the jury to look at “the intent, the purpose, the
design of the defendant,” adding that a finding that the device was intended
for use as a bomb or other explosive would place it under the statutory
definition of destructive device.272 The jury found the defendants guilty on
all counts.273 Posnjak appealed, arguing that the statute does not proscribe
commercial dynamite, regardless of the dynamite’s purpose.274
The Second Circuit concluded that a defendant’s subjective intent could
not render “destructive” a device that otherwise would not fall under 26
U.S.C. § 5845(f).275 It based its decision on the statutory language and
legislative history of the 1934 National Firearms Act and Gun Control Act
of 1968.276
The court inferred that the relevant provisions of the National Firearms
Act “focus on the particularly dangerous weapons subject to special rules
under the Gun Control Act.”277 It noted that section 5845(f)(1) lists several
military-type devices, and then adds “similar devices.”278 The logical
inference, the court noted, is that these other devices must not only be
similar in their explosiveness, but must be articles of military ordinance as
well.279
The court then addressed the government’s argument that 26 U.S.C.
§ 5845(f) proscribes commercial dynamite.280 It held that though that
section includes combinations “of parts designed or intended for use in
converting any device into a destructive device as defined in the earlier two
subparagraphs and from which such a device may be readily assembled,”
this section may not broaden the group of proscribed devices.281 The
components may only be subject to the law if the assembled device would
be subject to it; this subparagraph “merely precludes evasion through
possession of the unassembled components instead of the assembled
item.”282

270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 1112–13.
273. Id. at 1113.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 1120. Accordingly, the court reversed the defendants’ conviction, as it was
based upon the sale of commercial dynamite, which otherwise does not fall under the statute.
Id. at 1116, 1121.
276. Id. at 1113.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 1116.
279. Id. Contra United States v. Peterson, 475 F.2d 806, 810 (9th Cir. 1973) (noting that
Congress intended to proscribe military weapons as well as the "do-it-yourself type of
similar devices").
280. Posnjak, 457 F.2d at 1116.
281. Id.
282. Id. Moreover, subparagraph (3) initially covered “any combination of parts . . . for
use in converting any device into a destructive device.” The phrase “as defined in
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Furthermore, the court noted that “[t]he extensive legislative history
confirms the fact that certain types of guns were the weapons Congress was
most concerned to reach.”283 Its discussion included an excerpt from an
exchange between Senators Dodd and Metcalf regarding the definition of
“destructive device.”284 In this discussion, Senator Dodd stated that the
provision at hand specifically excluded items that may be used in
commercial construction or business activities.285 The Posnjak court
interpreted the legislative history as evincing a congressional concern with
clearly identifiable weapons which were the main cause of violent crime
and which had no lawful uses.286 Because these weapons are per se
dangerous, the intent of those using them is irrelevant.287
The Second Circuit thus concluded that an otherwise unproscribed item
may not be transformed into a “destructive device” by way of intent.288
This would entail impermissibly importing into subparagraph (3) items not
identified in subparagraphs (1) and (2).289 Moreover, the original version
of the Gun Control Act excluded from the definition of “destructive device”
items “neither designed nor redesigned nor used nor intended for use as a
weapon.”290 That the final version of the Act’s exclusionary clause
contained a design provision, but not one focused on intent, indicates a
congressional desire for an objective standard.291
To further bolster its conclusion, the Posnjak court made two points
related to statutory interpretation. First, since the National Firearms Act is
drafted in technical language,292 it should be construed technically.293
More generally, “it is a well-established principle that criminal statutes are
to be narrowly rather than expansively construed, in order to avoid
subjecting to prosecution any activities and individuals the legislature did
not mean to expose to liability.”294
Despite espousing an opinion which favored looking at a device’s
objective features rather than its user’s subjective intent, the Second Circuit
noted one significant caveat. Namely, when dealing with unassembled
component parts which are capable of conversion into either a device
subparagraphs (1) and (2)” was added to clarify this very point. Id. (citing S. 1854, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1967)).
283. Posnjak, 457 F.2d at 1115.
284. Id. at 1115–16.
285. Id.; see supra notes 129–30.
286. Posnjak, 457 F.2d at 1116.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 1117.
289. Id.
290. H.R. REP. NO. 90-1577, at 22 (1968).
291. Posnjak, 457 F.2d at 1117–18; see also United States v. Dalpiaz, 527 F.2d 548, 551
(6th Cir. 1975) (holding that when an item, by its objective nature, is excluded from the
statute under the ‘neither designed nor redesigned’ exception, “for purposes of determining
whether the device comes within the statutory exclusion, [the defendant’s] purpose is
irrelevant”).
292. Posnjak, 457 F.2d at 1118 (citing United States v. Collier, 381 F.2d 616, 618–19
(6th Cir. 1967).
293. Id. at 1118 (citing United States v. Lamb, 294 F. Supp. 419 (E.D. Tenn. 1968)).
294. Id. at 1118; United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971)).
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covered by the statute or one not covered, intent may be important.295
Posnjak itself, however, was not one such case because no combination of
the components in question could have rendered a device discussed in
subparagraphs (1) or (2).296
2. Additional Cases Adopting the Posnjak Standard
Judge Browning’s dissenting opinion in Oba bears a striking resemblance
to the Second Circuit’s holding in Posnjak.297 In his opinion, Judge
Browning cites United States v. Schofer,298 in which the court held that the
statute was not intended to reach ordinary materials through intent alone.299
Like the Posnjak court, Judge Browning relied on both the Act’s
statutory language and its legislative history in reaching his conclusion. As
for the former, he discussed the National Firearms Act’s imposition of taxes
on firearms, concluding that it is designed to discourage dealing in those
devices.300 As such, it applies only to two narrow groups of highly
dangerous weapons worthy of strict regulation.301
Additionally, prior to the 1968 amendments, the Act was commonly
known as the “Machine Gun Act.”302 It was intended to reach “carefully
identified weapons” used by those engaging in illegal activities.303 It was
only after an influx of surplus military weapons which had no legitimate
social use and threatened public safety that the Act added to its definition of
firearms “destructive devices.”304 Committee hearings, committee reports,
and congressional discourse refer to the destructive devices which the Act
covers as “military-type weapons,” or “primarily weapons of war,” which
have no legitimate social use.305

295. Id. at 1119; see also STEPHEN D. HALBROOK, FIREARMS LAW DESKBOOK § 6:11
(2010) (stating that the statute refers specifically to a “combination of parts” rather than
simply “parts;” therefore, the unassembled parts need not even be in proximity to one
another. Additionally, raw materials which may form a machine gun do not qualify as a
“combination of parts” under the statute).
296. Posnjak, 457 F.2d at 1120.
297. See supra Part II.B.1.
298. 310 F. Supp. 1292 (E.D.N.Y. 1970).
299. Id. at 1297–98. The Schofer court equated the potential for conversion into a
dangerous device with that of a parked car which can be made into “a lethal weapon by
perversion of its purpose.” Id. at 1297. The National Firearms Act, however, is aimed at
“evil articles,” not the evil usage of innocuous ones. Id. But see United States v. Peterson,
475 F.2d 806, 811 (9th Cir. 1973) (stating that “Congress manifestly intended to proscribe
friendly things when with evil intent they are combined or joined together to produce a
hostile object or device through the language used in subsection[] . . . (f)(3)”).
300. United States v. Oba, 448 F.2d 892, 896–97 (9th Cir. 1971) (Browning, J.,
dissenting).
301. Id. at 897.
302. Id.
303. Id. The Act was particularly concerned with making it difficult for gangsters to
obtain weapons. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id.; see also S. REP. NO. 90-1501, at 28 (1968).
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Finally, Judge Browning noted the untenable expansion of the Act which
would result from the majority’s reading of it.306 Such a reading, he
argued, would “bring within the Act any combination of parts which,
“‘when combined . . . could have been used destructively.’”307 More
specifically, a miner or lumberjack who used dynamite in his normal course
of business would have to register those devices and pay the appropriate
taxes under section 5845(f).308 In light of the above, as well as other
arguments previously discussed in Part I.A.1, Judge Browning concluded
that the National Firearms Act was not intended to reach ordinary
commercial blasting materials such as those at issue in Oba.309
In United States v. Fredman,310 the defendant appealed a conviction of
possession of unregistered firearms in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d).311
Here, the court considered specifically the issue of commercial dynamite.312
It held that commercial dynamite, absent some proof of intent for use as a
weapon, cannot qualify as a destructive device under section 5845(f).313
Thus, the court must produce some proof of intent to establish that such
items are destructive devices.314 The court even went so far as to say that,
absent proof of design or redesign as a weapon, intent is a “necessary
element.”315
The foregoing Fredman analysis appears capable of placing the case in
the Oba camp, as the Fredman court seemed to afford substantial weight to
the defendant’s intentions in determining whether the devices at issue were
statutorily destructive. Two further points offered by the court in reaching
its conclusion, however, dictate that Fredman comports with Posnjak’s
stance.
First, the court stressed the lack of evidence that the defendants intended
to use their devices as weapons.316 The court specifically distinguished
Fredman from cases such as Oba and Peterson, stating that in Fredman,
“[t]here is simply insufficient evidence . . . to support . . . the conclusion
306. Oba, 448 F.2d at 901 (Browning, J., dissenting).
307. Id. Such an interpretation would result in the sum of the parts exceeding the whole.
Id.
308. Id.
309. Id. at 898. Namely, the Act's focus on uniquely dangerous weapons, as opposed to
commonplace items, and the problem of unjustifiably broadening the Act's scope. See supra
310. 833 F.2d 837 (9th Cir. 1987).
311. Id. at 838. The devices in question were a commercial detonator cord, commercial
detonator fuses, and commercial igniters. Id. at 837–38.
312. Id. at 838–40.
313. Id. at 839. But see United States v. Price, 877 F.2d 334, 335–36 (5th Cir. 1989)
(holding that a homemade device is proscribed even though all of its components may be
possessed legally); United States v. Wilson, 546 F.2d 1175,1177 (5th Cir. 1977) (clarifying
that a homemade bomb is proscribed even though its explosive power is derived from
commercial dynamite); United States v. Curtis, 520 F.2d 1300, 1304 (1st Cir. 1975) (stating
that a homemade time bomb constitutes a “destructive device” even though its source of
power was commercial dynamite).
314. Fredman, 833 F.2d at 839.
315. Id.
316. Id. (“[T]hey were not accompanied by any other indicia of intent to use as a weapon
. . . .”).
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that the commercial explosive components . . . were originally ‘designed or
redesigned for use as a weapon . . . .’”317 This analysis implies that intent is
relevant specifically because the device’s objective nature did not indicate
for what type of use the defendant intended it.318
The Fredman court further distinguished Oba and Peterson on the basis
of Fredman’s device. Unlike those in Oba and Peterson, it consisted of
unassembled component parts.319 That the court explicitly makes this
distinction in reaching its conclusion implies that the parts’ unassembled
state was a critical factor in its reasoning. As the distinguishing
characteristic between Johnson and Posnjak is that the latter allows for
subjective intent analysis only in cases of unassembled parts, Fredman
appears to conform conceptually with the Second Circuit’s view.320
United States v. Malone321 involved the conviction of a defendant for
possession of an unregistered firearm under section 5861(d).322 Despite
possessing materials that could be assembled into a destructive device,
Malone did not have any explosive material necessary to complete such a
device.323 The Fifth Circuit held that, although the device had no legitimate
social use, the defendant could not be found guilty because he did not
possess all of the parts needed to create a destructive device.324
Though the Malone court explicitly declined to define what constitutes a
destructive device, its holding implies an inclination for an objective
standard. Namely, Malone’s device had no legitimate social value.
Accordingly, if the court would have afforded any considerable weight to
the import of his subjective intent, it may have concluded that the device
was a statutorily destructive one. That it refused to do so due to the
device’s incompleteness implies that it is only a device’s objective
characteristics, not its possessor’s intentions, that are a significant
consideration.325
In United States v. Ragusa,326 the district court convicted the defendant
for possession of a destructive device under section 5845(f).327 The court
noted the National Firearms Act’s emphasis on the possession, rather than
317. Id. at 840 (quoting 26 U.S.C § 5845 (2006)).
318. This conclusion runs directly counter to Oba, which seemed to allow for
consideration of subjective intent even when a device’s objective characteristics may be
dispositive. See supra Part II.A.1.
319. Fredman, 833 F.2d at 839.
320. See supra Part II.B.1.
321. 546 F.2d 1182 (5th Cir. 1977).
322. Id. at 1183.
323. Id.
324. Id. at 1184; cf. United States v. Simmons, 83 F.3d 686 (4th Cir. 1996). Simmons
held that a Molotov cocktail is a destructive device even in the absence of a match needed to
light it because a Molotov cocktail’s design and purpose is to cause injury or destroy
property. Id. at 688.
325. See also United States v. Markley, 567 F.2d 523, 527 (1st Cir. 1977) (holding that
devices with no legitimate social uses are “destructive devices” irrespective of their intended
purpose).
326. 664 F.2d 696 (8th Cir. 1981).
327. Id. at 698. The device in question was a collection of garbage bags holding
containers of gasoline, and connected by paper towels. Id. at 697.
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use, of a firearm.328 It interpreted this to suggest that a defendant need not
use a firearm in a criminal manner to be in violation of the statute.329
This analysis may be taken one step further. Logically, possession may
relate to a device’s objective nature. Use, on the other hand, pertains to a
defendant’s subjective intentions with respect to the device. That the
Ragusa court held the statute focuses on the former and not the latter330
indicates that it favored an objective approach.
Moreover, the court went on to state that although Congress aimed the
term “destructive device” at proscribing military-type weapons, the phrase
may also embrace homemade devices.331 The court’s example for the latter
category was a Molotov cocktail,332 a device which, simply by virtue of its
objective characteristics, falls within the Act’s reach.333
In United States v. Urban,334 the government charged the defendant with
Along with
possession of an unregistered destructive device.335
instructional books and pamphlets on manufacturing various weapons and
explosives, Urban possessed such items as an illegal firearm silencer, a
partially filled container of smokeless gunpowder, a homemade detonator,
and three fuse assemblies.336 After the district court found Urban guilty, he
appealed his conviction.337
The first intimation that Urban supports the Second Circuit’s view stems
from a somewhat puzzling statement in its opinion. Immediately after
citing Oba’s holding that “a device may be ‘converted’ into a destructive
device as defined in Subparagraphs (1) and (2) by way of ‘design or
intent,’”338 the court stated that “looking solely at the plain meaning of the
words used by Congress, a person may be found guilty of a violation of §
5861(d) if he or she is in possession of a combination of parts.”339
Presumably, this rules out an adherence to Johnson, which did not
distinguish between assembled devices and unassembled combinations of
parts.340
Particularly in light of its specific mention of Oba, it may seem logical to
read Urban as supporting the Ninth Circuit’s holding. Yet a deeper analysis
328. Id. at 699.
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. Id.
332. Id. at 700.
333. See, e.g., United States v. Cruz, 492 F.2d 217, 219 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v.
Ross, 458 F.2d 1144, 1145 (5th Cir. 1972). The Ross court stated that section 5845(f)’s list
of proscribed devices is descriptive, not exhaustive. The common denominator of the
devices listed is usage limited to anti-social purposes; thus, a Molotov cocktail, though not
mentioned by name, qualifies as a similar device, “as it has no purpose apart from criminal
activities.” Ross, 458 F.2d at 1145–46.
334. 140 F.3d 229 (3d Cir. 1998).
335. Id. at 231.
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. Id. at 232 (citing United States v. Oba, 448 F.2d 892, 894 (9th Cir. 1971)).
339. Id. The court appears to have gone out of its way to limit a subjective intent inquiry
to cases involving component parts, even though Oba made no such distinction.
340. United States v. Johnson, 152 F.3d 618, 623 (7th Cir. 1998).
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indicates otherwise. The court distinguished Urban from Fredman and
Morningstar on the basis of the lack of ambiguity as to the nature of
Urban’s device.341 Whereas Oba appeared to allow for a subjective intent
inquiry even when an objective inquiry may identify whether an item is
statutorily destructive or not,342 Urban explicitly refused to do so.343
Finally, the Urban court plainly stated that it agreed with Posnjak’s
construction of section 5845(f)(3).344
In United States v. Copus,345 the government charged the defendant with
manufacturing unregistered destructive devices.346 The authorities found,
among other items, a number of homemade detonators which the defendant
stated he used to blow up stumps.347 Appealing to the text of the National
Firearms Act, Copus argued that there was insufficient evidence to prove
that he intended to use his detonators as weapons.348
The court conceded that in the Seventh Circuit, it is “undisputed” that a
defendant’s intent is relevant in determining whether a combination of parts
may be labeled a destructive device.349 It noted, however, that Copus’s
detonators were fully assembled devices.350 It thus applied section
5845(f)(1), which covers “bomb[s]” or “similar device[s]” and which does
not contain an intent provision, rather than section 5845(f)(3).351 The
Copus holding is thus most consistent with Posnjak, allowing for subjective
intent analysis in cases of component parts, but not when dealing with fully
assembled devices.
Copus addressed another relevant question: assuming subjective intent is
relevant, what is the extent of its import in yielding a National Firearms Act
conviction?352 The Copus court, citing United States v. Worstine,353 stated
that the government is not required to prove the defendant intended to use
the device as a weapon.354 Rather, “where the objective purpose of a
device is not clear, the trier of fact may look to the defendant’s subjective
intent, as one element of the totality of the circumstances, to decide whether
the device qualifies as a “‘destructive device.’”355

341. Urban, 140 F.3d at 233.
342. See supra Part II.A.1.
343. Urban, 140 F.3d at 234 (“Intent to use the components as a weapon (to assemble
them into a device to be used as a weapon) is irrelevant when the parts are clearly designed
to be used in constructing a device which is specifically regulated by § 5845 (f)(1) or (2).”).
344. Id.
345. 93 F.3d 269 (7th Cir. 1996).
346. Id. at 271.
347. Id.
348. Id. at 272.
349. Id.
350. Id.
351. See id.
352. See id. at 273.
353. 808 F. Supp. 663 (N.D. Ind. 1992).
354. Copus, 93 F.3d at 273.
355. Id.
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This is in stark contrast with the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in United States
v. Lussier.356 There, the court interpreted Ninth Circuit precedent to dictate
that if devices fall under the statute’s “combination of parts” subsection,
“the Government was required to prove either that the devices were
designed for use, or that Lussier intended to use the devices, ‘in converting
any device into a destructive device.’”357 The court held that the
combination of parts subsection “explicitly requires proof” of design or
intent for use in converting a device into a destructive device.358
By contrast, the first subsection does not contain an intent provision; a
court may therefore deem a device “destructive” even in the absence of
proof of the defendant’s intent.359 Nonetheless, the court stated that while it
has “sometimes looked to a possessor’s intent” in cases that charge
defendants under this subsection, a showing of intent is generally a
necessary component of an action under subsection (C).360 The court
supported this distinction by stating that “since ‘parts’ are not necessarily
‘weapons,’ subsection (C) requires a showing of either design or intent to
‘convert’ the devices into a weapon.”361 By contrast, when dealing with
devices charged under the first two subsections, there is no dispute that such
are fully assembled weapons.362 Accordingly, no proof of intent is
required.363 This line of reasoning provides further logical support for
Oba’s distinction between assembled devices and component parts.
C. The Objective Standard, with a Slightly Larger Caveat
1. United States v. Johnson
In 1996, David Johnson was working at a Shopko store.364 On August 4
of that year, he directed an assistant store manager to a bag with a
protruding fuse.365 The police arrived, and upon discovering that the fuse
ran into a plastic pipe device, they evacuated the store and found another
similar device.366 Two days later, Johnson agreed to a search of his house,
which produced several components of the devices found at the store
including nails, plastic tubing, candles, and a hacksaw.367 Johnson

356. 128 F.3d 1312 (9th Cir. 1997).
357. Id. at 1314 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(4) (2006)).
358. Id. at 1314–15. Thus, whereas Copus merely allows for evidence of illicit intent to
contribute to proving that a device is destructive, Lussier effectively renders a showing to
this extent a necessary element of the prosecution’s action.
359. Id. at 1315.
360. Id. at 1316–17.
361. Id. at 1317.
362. See id. at 1315.
363. Id. It thus appears that Lussier’s view on evidence of intent in cases of fully
assembled parts corresponds to Copus’s stance thereof in cases on unassembled components;
namely, that use of such evidence is permissive, but not mandatory.
364. United States v. Johnson, 152 F.3d 618, 620 (7th Cir. 1998).
365. Id.
366. Id.
367. Id. at 621.
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confessed to constructing the devices, but asserted that he did so not to use
them as weapons, but to “play the hero” in locating them.368
The district court excluded evidence of Johnson’s subjective intent since
the devices had objective characteristics which sufficed to bring them under
the ambit of section 5845(f).369 The jury found him guilty of possession of
an unlicensed firearm in violation of the National Firearms Act.370
On appeal, Johnson argued that in cases of component parts, intent is
relevant because a defendant may possess such parts with or without the
intention to build a weapon.371 The appellate court’s reasoning centered on
legislative history and statutory interpretation. It noted that while the
legislative history demonstrated a specific concern with commercial
weapons, courts have read this concern as extending to homemade
devices.372
The opinion proceeded to state a critical distinction derived from the
court’s prior holdings. Namely, when a device is susceptible only to a
destructive use, it is automatically proscribed; intent is therefore
irrelevant.373 When a defendant possesses parts susceptible to either a
destructive or legitimate use, however, scrutiny into the possessor’s intent is
necessary.374
Perhaps the most significant aspect of Johnson’s analysis pertains to the
extent of this distinction between assembled devices and component parts.
The court began with the aforementioned conclusion that intent may be
relevant in cases of component parts.375 It then discussed intent only in the
context of unassembled parts,376 implying that Johnson adopts Oba’s view.
The court further stated explicitly that when a device is completely
assembled, the correct course is to proceed under section 5845 (f)(1),377
while unassembled parts compel a section 5845 (f)(3) analysis.378 Thus, to
the extent that an objective inquiry compels either inclusion or exclusion
under the statute, Johnson seems to agree with Oba’s distinction.
Johnson proceeded to state, however, that subparagraph (3) covers—
along with unassembled parts—fully assembled parts that are “less clearly
within the ambit of subpart (1).”379 When “the objective design inquiry is
not dispositive because the assembled device or unassembled parts may
form an object with both a legitimate and an illegitimate use, then

368. Id.
369. Id.
370. Id. at 620.
371. Id. at 622.
372. Id. at 624; see, e.g., United States v. Copus, 93 F.3d 269, 273–74 (7th Cir. 1996).
373. Johnson, 152 F.3d at 624; see also United States v. Thomas, 111 F.3d 426, 428 (6th
Cir. 1997) (stating that items with no legitimate social use are classified as section 5845(f)(1)
devices, and that for such devices, an intent inquiry is irrelevant).
374. Johnson, 152 F.3d at 624.
375. Id.
376. Id. at 624–25.
377. Id. at 627.
378. Id.
379. Id.
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subjective intent is an appropriate consideration.”380 Thus, whereas
Posnjak chose to consider subjective intent when an objective inquiry is
inconclusive only when dealing with unassembled parts, Johnson conflates
parts and fully assembled devices for the purpose of this analysis.
In its analysis, the Johnson court invoked the language of section
5845(f)(3), noting that the words “‘designed’” and “‘intended’” are
separated by the disjunctive word “‘or.’”381 This suggests that the words
have separate meanings; accordingly, conversion into a destructive device
may occur via either the device’s objective design or the defendant’s
intent.382 The court also cited United States v. Morningstar,383 which stated
that subparagraph (3) shows that Congress was concerned with more than
just gangster and military weapons.384
The Seventh Circuit thus concluded that when the destructive nature of a
device is obvious, intent is irrelevant.385 When dealing with devices or
component parts that can serve either a destructive or legitimate purpose,
however, an intent inquiry is appropriate.386 According to the Johnson
court, Congress intended for section 5845(f) to “operate in a precise but
flexible manner.”387 In the instant case, therefore, intent was not relevant,
as “the objective characteristics of these devices indicated that they were
useful only as weapons.”388 The court therefore excluded evidence as to
Johnson’s intent and affirmed his conviction.389
2. Additional Case Adopting the Johnson Standard
In United States v. Tankersley,390 the government charged the defendants
with possession of a destructive device.391 The prosecution argued that the
defendants intended on affixing an M-80 to paint remover and exploding
380. Id. at 628.
381. Id. at 625.
382. Id.; see also United States v. La Cock, 366 F.3d 883, 888 (10th Cir. 2004) (quoting
TRW, Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 18, 31 (2001)) (stating that “a statute ought . . . to be so
construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void,
or insignificant”).
383. 456 F.2d 278 (4th Cir. 1972).
384. Id. at 280–81.
385. Johnson, 152 F.3d at 627.
386. Id. Notably, the Johnson court referred to the question of whether a device has a
legitimate social use as “[t]he ultimate issue in this inquiry.” Id. at 626. But see United
States v. Dalpiaz, 527 F.2d 548, 551 (6th Cir. 1975) (stating that the critical issue is whether
the device in question is excluded by the statutory language; if it is, the social value test is
unnecessary). Additionally, Johnson stated that when dealing with a fully assembled device,
the appropriate course is to proceed under subparagraph (1), which does not include an intent
provision. Johnson, 152 F.3d at 627. Only if that approach is inconclusive may the court
consider intent. See id. at 628.
387. Johnson, 152 F.3d at 627.
388. Id. at 628.
389. Id. at 631.
390. 492 F.2d 962 (7th Cir. 1974).
391. Id. at 964. The device comprised a flammable liquid contained in a breakable
container, a detonator, and a fuse. The police observed the defendants in possession of the
device outside the home of a schoolteacher who had recently angered his colleagues by
electing to cross picket lines and report to work during a teacher’s strike. Id. at 965.
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them together.392 The defendants maintained that they intended to write on
the teacher’s car with the paint remover and explode the M-80
separately.393
The court began its analysis with the text of section 5845(f).394 After
quoting the statute, it wrote, “[t]herefore, a combination of certain
materials, coupled with the requisite intent, can be sufficient to constitute a
destructive device.”395 That constituted the extent of the court’s analysis in
connecting its conclusion with the statute’s text396 implies that it understood
the clear language of the statute to mean that subjective intent can be
relevant in defining a destructive device.
The Tankersley court noted the conflict between the Oba and Posnjak
courts.397 It stated that resolving this split was not necessary, as resort to
intention was proper under either approach, since this was a case of
components which could have been converted into either a proscribed or
unproscribed device.398 Accordingly, an attempt to classify this case under
the three established standards is inevitably somewhat tenuous.
Yet the opinion offers some subtle clues as to where on the “subjective
intent spectrum” it lies. First, it underplays the significance of the
indictment’s silence as to whether the device was assembled or not.399 This
appears to rule out the Second Circuit’s distinction between assembled
devices and unassembled components.
Next, the court concluded that “a combination of certain materials,
coupled with the requisite intent, can be sufficient to constitute a destructive
device.”400 One may properly infer that, contrary to the Ninth Circuit’s
view,401 intent alone does not suffice to beget a destructive device. It thus
appears that the Tankersley court’s holding supports that of the Seventh
Circuit in Johnson.
III. THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S STANDARD IS MOST CONGRUENT WITH THE
RELEVANT LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, STATUTORY TEXT, AND COMMON
SENSE
The opinions of the Oba, Posnjak and Johnson courts—as well as those
of the other courts discussed above—invoke arguments pertaining to the
National Firearms Act’s statutory language, its legislative history, and
notions of common sense in reaching their conclusions. Part III now
considers each category of arguments in turn.

392.
393.
394.
395.
396.
397.
398.
399.
400.
401.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 965–66.
Id. at 966.
See id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 964 n.1.
Id. at 966.
United States v. Oba, 448 F.2d 892, 894 (9th Cir. 1971).

2010]

JUST A SOUL WHOSE INTENTIONS ARE GOOD?

597

This Note does not, however, undertake this approach for mere
conceptual convenience. Rather, this Note reaches its final conclusion
through a three-step process. Part III.A, which discusses the Act’s
legislative history, serves to eliminate the Ninth Circuit’s approach from
consideration, while Part III.B, invoking statutory interpretation, primarily
accomplishes the same for that of the Seventh Circuit. Part III.C offers
further support for the Second Circuit’s stance being not only more sound
based on the legislative history and statutory language than those courts
discussed above, but standing on its own as the most logical and practically
favorable approach to the question at hand.
A. Legislative History
Throughout the development of the National Firearms Act, evidence
abounds as to a specific congressional concern with proscribing objectively
identifiable weapons to the exclusion of devices whose destructiveness
depends on their owners’ intentions. This history runs directly counter to
the Ninth Circuit’s stance in Oba, where the court stated that a device,
though in an objective sense not necessarily statutorily destructive, may be
rendered a “destructive device” by way of the defendant’s subjective
intent.402 Thus, a review of the Act’s legislative history serves to remove
the Oba approach from consideration.
The initial impetus for early gun control legislation was urban crime and
handgun use,403 and the resulting 1927 legislation specifically targeted
crime and criminals.404 These motivations pervaded the initial National
Firearms Act itself as well, as throughout the 1930s Congress committed
itself to combat the particular issue of gangsterism, which the wide
availability of machine guns helped to facilitate.405
The resulting legislation reflected this congressional focus. The National
Firearms Act aimed to proscribe those weapons which had gained
reputations as gangster weapons;406 consequently, it targeted those items
which were considered “inherently inimical to public safety.”407 Similarly,
the Federal Firearms Act aimed to prevent a certain “criminal class” from
obtaining firearms.408 The early gun control legislation’s implications are
thus clear: Congress sought to target particular individuals and objectively
identifiable weapons in its effort to ensure public safety.
Similar themes also pervaded the second wave of gun control legislation.
The post-World War II import of military weaponry played a large role in

402.
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404.
405.
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408.

See supra note 233 and accompanying text.
See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 47, 131 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 49–51 and accompanying text.
See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
See supra note 60.
See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
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spurring the gun control legislation of the 1960s,409 and the Gun Control
Act specifically aimed to curb the availability of such weapons.410
The 1968 amendment’s broader context is telling as well. Along with its
inclusion of destructive devices within the definition of firearms,411
Congress amended the Act to provide for interstate firearms dealing
regulation412 and to bring ammunition under the Act’s coverage.413
Congress thus undertook to proscribe destructive devices in conjunction
with other provisions which point to a broad congressional concern for
prohibiting crime and outlawing objectively dangerous weapons.
Moreover, there is explicit reference throughout the Act’s legislative
history to its primary purposes. Its preamble provides that the Act was
meant to aid the fight against crime and violence without placing an “undue
burden” on America’s law-abiding citizens.414 This statement reflects a
congressional intention to target specific weapons connected with crime and
violence, to the exclusion of homemade devices which a possessor may use
for either legitimate or harmful purposes.
Judge Browning’s dissent in Oba415 offers one example of an undue
burden to which a primarily subjective standard would give rise. He stated
that under the Oba approach, a miner or a lumberjack who used commercial
devices legitimately could be required to register those devices, and face
prosecution for his failure to do so.416
Additionally, the statute focused particularly on the possession, as
opposed to the use, of the proscribed items.417 Whereas use requires some
degree of a defendant’s subjective intentions, possession exists on a solely
objective plane; a defendant either possesses an item, or he does not.418
That the statute focuses on the latter suggests its preference for an objective,
rather than subjective, standard.419
Perhaps most poignant are the remarks of Senator Thomas Dodd, the
trailblazer of 1960s gun control legislation.420 Senator Dodd stated that he
intended the Act to reach “things like hand grenades,” while explicitly
excluding from its scope “items which would be used in commercial
construction or business activities.”421
Thus, throughout the development of both the initial and current
incarnations of the National Firearms Act, the legislative history evinces a
clear congressional concern with objectively identifiable items with
409.
410.
411.
412.
413.
414.
415.
416.
417.
418.
419.
420.
421.

See supra notes 80–86 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 128–31 and accompanying text.
See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 106, 126 and accompanying text.
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See supra notes 121–22, 132 and accompanying text.
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See supra note 330 and accompanying text.
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characteristics that serve to connect these items with illicit activities such as
gangsterism. Expanding the reach of this rule to cover additional items
based merely on a defendant’s intentions, as was suggested by the Ninth
Circuit in Oba,422 is plainly incongruent with the motivations that underlie
the Act.
B. Statutory Text
At this point in the analysis, the stances of the Second Circuit in Posnjak
and the Seventh Circuit in Johnson seem more consistent with the Act’s
legislative history than does that of the Oba court. This part of the Note
primarily discusses notions of statutory interpretation to conclude that
Posnjak’s reading of section 5845 (f) is more logical than that of the
Johnson court. Before doing so, however, several points relating to
statutory interpretation effectively serve as the death knell for a
consideration of Oba’s stance.
The Oba line of cases appears to place the horse before the cart, focusing
on selective terms within the statute in order to reach their respective
conclusions. Peterson does so in its discussion of “similar devices” to
broaden the Act’s scope,423 while Morningstar does the same in its
consideration of the statute’s reference of a defendant’s intent.424
These readings, however, ignore the broader context of the Act which
allows for such considerations if they will convert a device into a
destructive device “as defined in subparagraphs (1) and (2) . . . .”425 This
provision was in fact not even part of the original Act’s wording, and was
later added to eliminate the possibility of the Act being misconstrued in this
exact fashion.426 Thus, contrary to the interpretations of these cases, a
correct reading of the Act does not allow for considerations such as a
defendant’s intent to broaden the category of devices which the Act
explicitly covers.
Additionally, this Note discussed previously the Peterson and Posnjak
courts’ directly opposing stances on interpreting the statute’s use of the
phrase “similar devices.”427 The notion of nonscitur a sociis requires a
court to interpret a general term to be similar to more specific terms in a
series.428 Relatedly, ejusdem generis calls for an interpretation of a general
term to reflect the class of objects reflected in more specific terms which
accompany it.429 Thus, contrary to Peterson’s—and by logical extension,
Oba’s—contentions, the “similar devices” phrase does not expand the Act’s

422. See supra note 233 and accompanying text.
423. See supra notes 239–43 and accompanying text.
424. See supra notes 253–55 and accompanying text.
425. See 26 U.S.C. § 5845 (f)(3) (2006) (emphasis added).
426. See supra notes 290–91.
427. See supra notes 241, 278–79 and accompanying text.
428. See, e.g. Russell Motor Car Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 514, 519-20 (1923). See
also BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY 864 (3d ed. 1969).
429. See, e.g., Sports Graphics, Inc. v. United States, 24 F.3d 1390, 1392 (Fed. Cir.
1994).
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umbrella to reach items which are not proscribed by it based on the items’
objective characteristics.
In addition to the actual words of the statute, further support for an
objective approach exists in certain features not contained in the statutory
wording itself. One is the fact that the original Act was known as the
“Machine Gun Act,”430 a moniker that speaks to the Act’s concern for
weapons of war with no legitimate social use.431 The very existence of the
question as to whether a defendant will use a device for harm dictates that
such an item is not one with which Congress was concerned. The
subjective intent inquiry should end—not begin—the statutory liability
analysis.
Finally, the words which the statute omits may be just as telling as those
which it contains. The 1986 Firearms Owners’ Protection Act added
specific scienter requirements to statutes related to the National Firearms
Act, but declined to do so for the National Firearms Act itself.432 This
omission further supports a congressional preference for an objective
approach when considering National Firearms Act prosecutions.
Statutory interpretation further supports Posnjak’s preference for
distinguishing unassembled parts from fully assembled devices, allowing
for a potential exception to a generally objective approach only in the
former case.433 As noted by the Posnjak court, courts should construe
statutes which are written in technical language, such as the National
Firearms Act, technically.434 Similarly, courts should read criminal
statutes, such as this, narrowly in order to limit the possibility of
prosecuting individuals whom the legislature did not intend to subject to
criminal liability.435
Two additional canons of statutory construction compel a similar
conclusion. First, the plain meaning rule dictates that courts interpret legal
text according to the text’s plain meaning.436 Additionally, courts should
not read statutes in a way that would render any of their provisions
superfluous.437 Reading section 5845(f)(3) to cover either unassembled
parts or fully assembled devices, as the Johnson court tries to do, is in direct
violation of both of these principles.
Regarding the former, the plain meaning of “unassembled parts” is
unassembled—not fully-assembled—devices. As for the latter, if both
categories are to be placed on equal ground, there is no reason for the
statute to go out of its way to introduce this subsection as referring to a
“combination of parts.” These principles of statutory construction thus
dictate that the phrase “combination of parts” in subparagraph (3) should, as
430.
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posited by the Posnjak court, pertain exclusively to unassembled
combinations of parts, and not to fully assembled devices.438
C. Additional Support for the Second Circuit’s Stance
The remainder of this Note offers arguments which, while not necessarily
based on legislative history or grounded in formal statutory construction
canons, appeal to common sense in providing additional support for the
Posnjak approach. These arguments illustrate that Posnjak not only
provides a more sound opinion than Oba or Johnson in a theoretical sense,
but it also represents the ideal stance for courts to apply in practical
situations.
One such argument is based on the Federal Rules of Evidence. Rule 401
states that “‘[r]elevant evidence’ means any evidence having a tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination
of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence.”439 Rule 402 provides that relevant evidence is generally
admissible.440
A thorough analysis of the Federal Rules of Evidence is far beyond the
scope of this Note. One may, however, effectively apply the above rules to
the present issue. In cases involving unassembled combinations of parts
whose objective characteristics do not conclusively denote a legitimate or
harmful use, the defendant’s intent surely falls within the gambit of Rule
401441 Accordingly, in such cases courts should consider evidence
pertaining to the defendant’s subjective intent. This is precisely the
conclusion for which Posnjak stands.
Similarly, an adoption of the Johnson opinion, which treats unassembled
parts and assembled devices equally, overlooks a key point and yields
flawed conclusions. The Lussier court observed that “‘parts’ are not
necessarily ‘weapons.’”442 Parts and devices are categorically, not
incidentally, different. One may even argue that assembled devices, by
their completed nature, inhere a certain degree of intent; there is obviously
some rhyme or reason underlying these parts being assembled as they are.
The eventual use of these parts will likely reflect this purpose. This
element is lacking in cases of unassembled parts, however; a possessor may
eventually use such parts for a range of purposes unrelated to the nature of
the parts themselves.
Consequently, courts should view the two categories through completely
different lenses. Allowing a consideration of intent when dealing with
assembled devices not only runs counter to the statute’s wording, it may
even run counter to the essence of the item at hand. Johnson noted that
438. This also conforms with the statutory canon of expressio unius; namely, that the
expression of one thing suggests the exclusion of others. See, e.g., O’Melveny & Myers v.
FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 85 (1994).
439. FED. R. EVID. 401.
440. FED. R. EVID. 402.
441. FED. R. EVID. 401.
442. See supra note 361 and accompanying text.

602

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

when an objective inquiry indicates for what purposes an item will be used,
a court should not consider subjective intent. It failed, however, to take the
next logical step in its analysis: that this is always the case when dealing
with fully assembled devices.
Johnson’s failure to recognize this point, and therefore to place parts and
devices on equal footing, has two potentially fatal results. One is a direct
conflict with the court’s own professed interpretation of the statute; the
second is an overexpansion of the statute’s reach to illegitimate items which
should not be proscribed.
None of these obstacles besets Posnjak. It favors objective inquiries over
considerations of those of subjective intent and forbids intent analysis
whenever dealing with assembled devices, an approach which avoids the
pitfalls which invalidated both Oba and Johnson.
Revisiting the hypotheticals which Part I of this Note discussed likely
provides the strongest support for these contentions. The first hypothetical
requires little discussion, as all three circuit courts would agree that intent is
relevant when dealing with a defendant who possessed empty bottles and
gasoline, and claimed he intended to use those unassembled parts to make
Molotov cocktails.443
The next example444 discussed a case involving an item such as that at
issue in Spoerke, one in which Posnjak would disagree with Oba and
Johnson. There, the item was a homemade explosive made of polyvinyl
chloride pipe capable of propelling shrapnel.445 Here, Posnjak alone would
hold that intent is not relevant, as the device was fully assembled.446 This
conclusion appears far more logical than one which considers intent; if a
person is in possession of a homemade explosive such as this, which is
capable of propelling shrapnel, it seems incongruent to fail to proscribe it
outright under a statute which aims to cover destructive devices.
The final example involved a defendant in possession of commercial
dynamite which he planned to use for harm.447 Here, Posnjak and Johnson
would agree that intent should not be relevant, while Oba would hold that it
is. Once again, Posnjak is on the correct side of the argument, as the Act’s
legislative history evinces a clear preference against proscribing
commercial dynamite.448 Thus, not only is Posnjak the ideal approach in
theory, comporting most highly with legislative history and statutory
construction, it is the most logically unassailable approach when applied in
practical scenarios as well.
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CONCLUSION
The question of how much gravity—if any— a court may confer upon a
defendant’s subjective intent in determining whether that defendant
possessed a statutorily destructive device is complex and multifaceted. The
circuit split which underlies this Note appeals to notions of statutory
interpretation, legislative history, public safety concerns, and perhaps most
significantly, a discerning degree of common sense in properly parsing the
views of the Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits on this matter. Each
opinion listed above invoked some combination of these and other factors
in reaching its conclusion.
In light of all relevant factors and for the reasons set forth in Part III of
this Note, the most sound approach is that of the Second Circuit in Posnjak,
advocating a standard which looks primarily to an item’s objective
characteristics, but allows for consideration of subjective intent, specifically
in cases of unassembled parts when an objective inquiry leaves open the
possibilities of conversion into either a proscribed or unproscribed
device.449 Adherence to Posnjak assures uniformity with legislative intent,
accuracy in statutory interpretation, and consistency with general notions of
legality, logic, and public welfare. Therefore, this standard should prevail
as courts continue to consider the question of subjective intent in National
Firearms Act prosecutions.

449. See supra notes 13–16 and accompanying text.

